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i“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
ii
ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΙΑΣ
Περίληψη
Τμήμα Ηλεκτρολόγων Μηχανικών και Μηχανικών Υpiολογιστών
Διpiλωματική Εργασία
Διαχείριση Πληροφοριών Κυβερνοεpiιθέσεων
Ιωάννης Σταμούλης
Η Κυβερνοασφάλεια είναι ένα piεδίο, στο οpiοίο μόλις piρόσφατα εστιάστηκε η piροσο-
χή και η σημασία του αυξάνεται συνεχώς, όσο αυξάνεται ο αριθμός διασυνδεδεμένων
χρηστών και συσκευών, και κατά συνέpiεια ο όγκος των δεδομένων piου μεταδίδονται.
Αφορά εξίσου τα άτομα καθώς και μεγαλύτερες οντότητες, όpiως εταιρείες και κυβερ-
νήσεις. Υpiάρχουν μέθοδοι και εργαλεία piου μpiορούν να piαρέχουν ένα βαθμό piροστα-
σίας αpiό αpiειλές στον κυβερνοχώρο. Η piαρούσα διpiλωματική εργασία έχει σκοpiό να
διερευνήσει τα μέσα για την εpiίτευξη αυτής της piροστασίας, piεριγράφοντας αρχικά μια
γενική ροή εργασίας για τον εντοpiισμό συμβάντων στον κυβερνοχώρο και στη συνέχεια
εξετάζοντας εργαλεία και υpiηρεσίες, τα οpiοία μpiορούν να χρησιμοpiοιηθούν piροληpiτικά
ή αντιδραστικά για την εκpiλήρωση αυτού του σκοpiού. Οι piροληpiτικές εpiιλογές μpiορούν
να διακριθούν σε δύο κατηγορίες, είτε σε εργαλεία piου μpiορούν να εγκατασταθούν και
να χρησιμοpiοιηθούν αpiό μια ομάδα αpiόκρισης έκτακτης ψηφιακής ανάγκης (῝ΕΡΤ), είτε
σε υpiηρεσίες piου piαρέχουν εξωτερικές piληροφορίες σχετικά με αpiειλές. Η αντιδραστι-
κή piροσέγγιση εpiικεντρώνεται στη συλλογή και βελτίωση piληροφοριών, piροκειμένου να
εξαχθούν piολύτιμα δεδομένα piου μpiορούν να βοηθήσουν στην αντιμετώpiιση μιας εξε-
λισσόμενης εpiίθεσης ή να αpiοτρέψουν τις μελλοντικές εpiιθέσεις αpiό το να piροκαλέσουν
εκτεταμένη καταστροφή.
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Cybersecurity is a field that has only recently gained attention and becomes more
relevant as the number of interconnected devices and users rises, and thus the vol-
ume of transmitted data increases. It is a concern both for individuals, as well as
for larger entities, such as corporations and governments. Fortunately, there are
methods and tools that can provide a degree of protection against cyber threats. In
this thesis, the means to achieve this protection will be explored, first by outlining
the general workflow for cyber incident detection and then by inspecting individual
tools and services that can be used proactively or reactively to fulfill this purpose.
The proactive options can be categorized into two groups, either tools that a Cyber
Emergency Response Team (CERT) can deploy and operate, or services that provide
external information about threats. The reactive approach to Cybersecurity focuses
on the collection and refinement of information, in order to extract valuable data
that can assist in mitigating an ongoing attack or prevent future attacks from caus-
ing extensive damage.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A brief history of Cyber Security Events and Regulations
1.1.1 First major attacks
Cyber Security is a field that has only recently gained widespread popular attention
due to several major events happening in the last decade. However, it has existed
at various levels of maturity for a long time and its history can be traced back to the
early 1970’s.
The earliest incident to be categorized as a cyber security breach, happened in 1971
and it was a worm created as an experiment by Robert (Bob) Thomas who was a re-
searcher for BBN Technologies in Cambridge, Massachusetts . However, the worm,
named Creeper was not malicious and its functionality was limited to moving across
ARPANET terminals, printing the message "I’m the creeper: catch me if you can" and
then deleting itself. In response the program Reaper was developed, which would
find copies of Creeper and delete them from the system. Reaper is considered to be
the earliest form of Antivirus [26, 29].
The first Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack to span the entire early internet happened in
1989. It was a worm created by Robert Morris and was not intended to be harmful.
Instead, it was meant to test the size of the internet by going through networks and
copying itself in UNIX terminals. Since it could infect a computer multiple times and
could replicate rapidly, it caused machines to progressively slow down to the point
of being damaged, resulting in 6000 computers being affected, causing an estimated
10−100 million dollars in repair bills. It also resulted in a partition of the internet
lasting for several days [26, 29, 4].
Coincidentally, the first ransomware attack was also recorded in 1989. It was a mal-
ware developed by Jospeh Popp, called the AIDS Trojan. It was distributed by mail-
ing floppy disks through the mail. It was not as severe as modern ransomware
attacks, due to only encrypting file names, while leaving the rest of the system intact
and usable. Programs like AIDS_OUT were quickly created to unlock the files [29].
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1.1.2 Legislation towards better security
In 1990 the Parliament of the United Kingdom introduced the Computer Misuse Act,
which was the first piece of legislation concerning cyber security. This made any
unauthorized access or modification of computer material illegal. It is still in effect
and has been amended several times in order to be kept up to date and effectively
cover modern situations. It has become the model of similar legislation for several
countries [29].
Similar legislation has been implemented in the United States in 1996, 1999 and 2002,
which requires the data of health care organizations, federal agencies and financial
institutions to be protected. However, these regulations have been called into ques-
tion due not being specific enough, and thus open to interpretation, which hinders
efforts to achieve a uniform level of security. Several bills have been proposed to
bring the regulations up to date.
In the European Union the cyber security regulations are more clearly defined. Three
major regulations within the EU include the ENISA, the NIS Directive and the EU
GDPR.
ENISA, originally created in March 2004 is the European Union Agency for Network
and Information Security and its operations focus on three factors [15]:
• Recommendations to member states on actions against security breaches
• Policy making and implementation support for all members states of the EU
• Direct support with ENISA taking a hands-on approach to working with
operational teams in the EU
The Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive) was set
into effect in 2016 aims to improve the overall level of cyber security in the EU by
requiring organizations providing essential services to report incidents to Computer
Security Incident Response Teams Each member state has to implement its strategy
in a way to handle security breaches with minimal impact [18].
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was set into place in 2016 and
enforced in 2018 and is meant to standardize data protection across all members of
the EU in order to protect EU citizens from privacy and data breaches [20].
1.2 Importance of Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is relevant to everyone, not only to businesses and countries, but also
to anyone with access to a digital device. As we move into the era of Internet-of-
Things, we progressively rely more on the internet for communication and services.
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The number of internet users and by extension, the number of interconnected de-
vices containing sensitive information increases as well, as it is shown in figure 1.1.
This increase introduces new weak spots to be exploited for malicious purposes.
Thus the importance of Cybersecurity is made clear, as a security breach in any mod-
ern system can lead to important data being compromised. Such data include the
following:
• e-mail, phone numbers, social media credentials and personal information
• tax records, licenses and official documents
• medical or insurance records
• bank accounts, checks, loan information and credit card details
FIGURE 1.1: Population of the Internet[13]
The consequences of such data being obtained by malicious parties vary depending
on the victim. If the victim is a company, it can suffer severe financial losses, tech-
nological innovations and intellectual property can be made available to competing
companies and the data of its employees can be accessed. If the victim is a govern-
ment official records can be accessed and altered and information that is intended
to be kept secret can be exposed to the public or foreign nations, potentially leading
to unrest or international incidents. If the victim is a private individual, sensitive
personal information such as pictures and messages can be obtained and aside from
the potential financial damage and defamation that can occur, social media profiles
and e-mails can be hijacked and used to spread malware leading to further breaches
in security.
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Depending on the context, Cybersecurity can take several forms. Governments and
large corporations can employ a Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT) to handle
its security needs, from network and system setup to responding to a cyber attack
if one slips through the countermeasures already in place. Smaller institutions that
may not be able to afford to employ a dedicated team should also try to have a
network designed to be as secure as possible and procedures to mitigate an attack if
one occurs. Individuals should also use the internet responsibly to avoid being the
victim of an attack and stop it from spreading in that situation.
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Background
As was highlighted before, Cybersecurity is increasingly important to safeguard the
extensive volumes of data that are generated and circulated daily. To achieve that,
there are four key elements that define the modern Cybersecurity mindset, which is
summarized in the phrase "Prevention is ideal, detection is a must" [23]. These are:
• Presumption of Compromise
• Detection Oriented Defense
• Hunt Teams
• Post-Exploitation Focus
Since the focus in on Post-Exploitation, visibility is essential. To achieve a sufficient
level of visibility there are four questions that need to be answered:
• How do I collect logs?
• Which logs do I collect?
• How do I parse and enrich my logs?
• What do I look for in this mountain of data?
2.1 Log Collection
A proposition to supplement any existing Security Information and Event Manage-
ment (SIEM) system is the Elastic Stack. It is a chain of tools such as Elasticsearch,
Logstash and Kibana, that serve to collect, parse and enrich high volume logs. It
also provides visualizations and dashboards to provide a quick overview of the col-
lected data. This leads to accurate reporting, correlation and alert creation, utilizing
machine learning and graph analytics. It supports horizontal scaling and provides
commercial features and support, while also being compatible with third party plu-
gins, created by an active community.
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2.2 Log Selection and Enrichment
Logs that may hold value to examine after an exploitation event, in order to improve
visibility can be divided into two groups, host logs and network logs. The most
popular host logs fall in these categories:
• Security, System, Application
• Sysmon
• PowerShell
• Autorun items
• AppLocker
• Files, Registry
These logs, potentially, hold information about authentication, process creation, net-
work connections initiated by suspicious processes, registry keys, autoruns and whitelist-
ing detections.
The most popular netork logs fall in these categories:
• DNS
• HTTP
• SSL Certs
• SMTP
• NetFlow
• Host / Network Firewall & IDS
• Full PCAP
These logs, potentially, hold information about Command & Control, unexpected
internal traffic, executables, SSL Certificates, password spraying, guessing and brute
forcing, network share & user scanning and Internal firewall denials.
Utilizing Logstash, which is part of the aforementioned Elastic Stack, options become
available that allow, ingestation of bulk inputs, modification of output files, as well
as enrichment. Inputs are more easily received due to the availability of buffers and
backpressure. Outputs can be generated in CSV, XML, Key-Value or JSON formats to
make automatic parsing easier. Enrichment provides context such as domain_stats,
freq, ASN, GeoIP, OUI, REST.
Collecting high value, tactical host and network logs and subsequently enriching
them leads to a lower number of false positives and improves host and network
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visibility. This in turn improves the chance that an incident is detected. It is im-
portant to take into consideration that attackers use custom tools and try to access a
multitude of protocols.
2.3 Incident Detection
In order to detect an incident, it is important to know what we are looking for in the
logs. MITRE ATT&CK provides a complete suite of threat models and frameworks,
as well as post-compromise behavior lists that serve as a guide in this direction.
FIGURE 2.1: ATT&CK Adversarial Tactics and Techniques[32]
The figure above shows MITRE’s ATT&CK Navigator, which contains tactics and
techniques used by attackers. Each column represents a tactic and in the rows below
there are techniques used to accomplish the corresponding tactic. Techniques can
belong to more than one tactic and each box is clickable and redirects to detections
and mitigations for each technique. The information provided by the Navigator
helps create a checklist to provide high level analytics, identify the most dangerous
events to miss and measure defenses objectively. It also grants insight in the top
level of the pyramid of Indicators of Compromise (IoC) regarding adversary activity
(figure 2.2), which is hard to approach otherwise.
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FIGURE 2.2: "The Pyramid of Pain"[14]
To implement an effective threat detection system, it is suggested that an iterative
approach containing the following steps is adopted.
• Quantify detection levels
• Write analytics and track progress
• Perform red or purple teaming to repeatedly test detections and automate the
process if possible
Quantifying detection maturity can be achieved by defining seven levels of maturity
and rating each technique depending on the ability to detect it. These levels usually
are the following and can be visualized on the ATT&CK Navigator as shown in
figure 2.3:
• No Detection
• Locally Logged
• Centrally Logged
• Log Enriched/Correlated
• Report / Visualization
• Experimental / Functional Detection
• High Fidelity Detection
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FIGURE 2.3: Detection Maturity visualized
To improve the incident detection capability, tools can be used to execute tests, col-
lect data, develop detection and finally measure progress and visualize it. To speed
up that process, automated adversary emulation tools can be utilized to achieve au-
tomation, such as Caldera and Metta, which come with accompanying datasets and
analysis tools. However, this automated process generates a vast amount of data,
that need to be converted to analytics that need to be easily interpreted by ana-
lysts. This has led to the development of a standardized format for analytics, named
Sigma, that enables easy import and sharing accross organizations, decouples rule
logic from specific implementations and eliminates SIEM tribal knowledge.
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Chapter 3
Proactive techniques and tools
3.1 Introduction
As we have seen in the previous chapter, while detection of incidents is a non-
negotiable goal, prevention is the ideal scenario. In this chapter we will explore
tools and techniques that are being utilized by CERTs to proactively detect cyber in-
cidents. Proactive detection of a threat by a CERT, as opposed to reactive detection,
is the discovery of malicious activity before its effects become apparent to the con-
stituency the CERT is protecting. This can be achieved by utilizing internal monitor-
ing tools or published information about detected incidents. Proactively detecting
incidents boosts the CERT’s capabilities, improves situational awareness and grants
greater efficiency when handling incidents.
There are two approaches when it comes to achieving effective proactive detection,
depending on where the threat originates from. On one hand there are tools that
the CERT can deploy to monitor internal events in its constituency. These may only
cover the network that the CERT is directly responsible for. In other cases they can
extend to cover a larger part of the CERT’s employer’s network or even be a part of
a larger array with a nation-wide scope.
On the other hand, there are services that are available over the internet and can
be accessed to obtain information about network security incidents detected outside
the monitoring capabilities of the CERT. These can be either free, require registration,
or come with a fee. The data they provide can be filtered and pre-processed and
structured, or available as a raw feed in the state that it was collected.
The wide coverage that is made possible by these services offers an advantage, es-
pecially to CERTs that don’t have the means to collect such data on their own and
ones that are responsible for entire countries or regions.
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3.2 Tools for Proactive Detection
In this section we will explore the most common types of tools used by CERTs for
proactive detection of incidents and their assessment by ENISA[17].
3.2.1 Client honeypots
Client honeypots are tools that are capable of active search for malicious servers.
They aim to identify whether there has been an attack after establishing contact with
a server. There are three main types of honeypots:
• High-interaction honeypots are systems with complete functionality typically de-
ployed as virtual machines. They operate by simulating a system belonging
to the client, which in turn tries to access various servers. They have moni-
toring capabilities in order to observe changes and detect suspicious activity
after making contact which are then reported in logs. Monitoring such a wide
range of parameters comes at a cost to performance. They are, however, the
most popular type used in home user cases.
• Low-interaction honeypots offer a different solution to the same problem. These
emulate the behavior of particular pieces of software and directly observe the
responses related to its activity. They can be efficient and cheap, however they
are limited to mostly detecting pre-existing, known threats, as they lack the
ability to observe unknown behavior.
• Hybrid client honeypots are an attempt to leverage the strong points of the pre-
vious two types of honeypots. Combined information of low and high in-
teraction honeypots can give a more complete overview of an exploitation or
infection providing better capability of restricting a threat.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Fair+ Fair + Fair + Good Excellent Fair
3.2.2 Server honeypots
Server honeypots are essentially traps that are set in place in order to monitor unau-
thorized attempts of accessing and using a network or system. They are monitored
to serve as an early warning system or observe trends of suspicious activity. Many
honeypots can be deployed in a network to provide wider coverage.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
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timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Good Good Good Good Good Good
3.2.3 Sandboxes
Sandboxes are environments specifically designed to let potentially malicious code
to be executed in isolation, without access to the rest of the system in order to observe
its behavior without a risk of infection. All of its behavior, especially network access
attempts, is then analyzed to assess whether it is malicious. Malicious code will often
try to connect to the internet to download executables and tracing these connections
can reveal the address of infected servers or dedicated servers distributing malware.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Fair+ Fair N/A Good Fair+ Fair<
3.2.4 Firewall
Firewalls are either physical devices or software that is designed to filter network
connections. They aid in proactive detection by generating an alert any time a suspi-
cious connection is detected, either inbound or outbound. For example, attempted
bulk connections to a known service can be interpreted as a hint of a worm infection.
Similarly mass attempted connections to a single address may reveal a DDoS attack.
Firewalls can be utilized in two ways:
• Directly generate alerts.
• Use additional tools to perform analysis on the firewall’s logs.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Fair Good Fair+ Good Excellent Fair+
3.2.5 IDS/IPS
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are software applications designed to observe and
analyze network traffic and system behavior in order to identify possible malicious
events. They typically have a passive role, generating an alert in case they detect a
threat. Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) on the other hand share a lot of similari-
ties but work actively to block threats. These systems can detect malicious behavior
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by either comparing it to known attack patterns or by comparing it to the typical
behavior of the system and noticing a deviation.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Good Good Fair+ Fair+ Good Fair+
3.2.6 NetFlow
Netflow is a mechanism that collects monitors and analyzes traffic based on the IP
protocol. It can be effective in detecting irregular traffic and is very useful in both
detecting and combating DDoS attacks. It mainly focuses on detecting compromised
devices within a network.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Good Fair Fair+ Fair Good+ Good
3.2.7 Darknet
Darknets are used to monitor traffic that is directed to unused IP addresses without
being related to any of the other observed traffic. It works best when the number
of unused IP addresses is large. They can potentially aid in the detection of worms,
DDoS attacks or network devices without proper configuration, which contribute to
their false positive reports.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Good Fair Fair+ Fair Good Fair
3.2.8 Passive DNS monitoring
Analyzing DNS traffic can reveal potential malicious activity. This analysis can pro-
vide information about the origin of an attack or discover a botnet. Malicious do-
mains can be identified by comparing DNS querry results to blacklists containing
known malicious domains. Additionally, monitoring DNS traffic can reveal trends
that can potentially lead to the discovery of malicious activity.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
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timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Good+ Good Fair+ Good Good+ Fair
3.2.9 Antivirus programs
Antivirus programs are used to block, detect and delete malware from computers.
They are usually built around detecting specific signatures associated with mal-
ware, which makes them most suited to detecting threats that are already known.
Newer iterations have some additional capabilities, allowing them to potentially de-
tect even unknown threats.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Good Good Fair+ Good Good N/A
3.2.10 Spamtrap
A Spamtrap is a form of honeypot that is dedicated to detecting spam. In most
cases it is simply a modified email inbox that is advertised in a way that is visible to
spammers with a purpose of being harvested and added to their databases. After re-
ceiving unwanted mail, the addresses of the sender can be obtained and categorized
as spam.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Fair+ Fair Fair Good Good Good
3.2.11 Web Application Firewall
Web application firewalls can be devices, plugins or filters that apply a set of restric-
tions to HTTP connections. By modifying the set of rules, they can be customized to
cover a wide range of attacks, detect them and block them in case they occur. Such
customization may require significant effort however.
ENISA has rated this tool as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage resources scalability extensibility
Excellent Good+ Fair Fair Fair Good Good
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3.2.12 Application logs
Analysis of application logs can include logs generated by the system, databases
or network activity. This way, irregular behavior, such as repeated unsuccessful
log-in attempts, can be detected and the origin address of these interactions can be
compared with the contents of blacklists to determine if it is actually malicious.
3.3 Available services for Proactive Detection
A study conducted by ENISA has focused on tools providing information used for
proactive detection of cyber incidents [17]. In this study the tools have been evalu-
ated in five categories and given a rank in each one. These categories are timeliness,
accuracy, ease of use, coverage and required resources.
3.3.1 DNS-BHMalware Domain Blocklist
The DNS-BH project curates a list of domains related to spyware and malware. This
list can be used to provide zone files and information about the blacklisted domains.
Long term filters can be created to monitor traffic and create alerts when access to a
blacklisted domain is attempted [38].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Fair Good Excellent Excellent Excellent
3.3.2 MalwareURL
The MalwareURL team provides a database containing up-to-date information about
observed URLs and IP addresses reated to malicious activity. After registration the
contents of the database can be provided in CSV and RSS formats. However it is not
free for commercial use [42].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Good Excellent Excellent Excellent
3.3.3 Dshield
DShield is a distributed intrusion detection system used to collect and analyze data.
The collected data is cataloged and summarized and can reveal trends in activities
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confirm attacks and drive forward changes in firewall design. The blocklist it pro-
vides can be used as a filter to produce alerts of attempted access to blacklisted ad-
dresses. It also supplies a list of the top 100 malicious IP addresses, which can be
utilized to assess the severity of an attack [25].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Fair Good Excellent Excellent
3.3.4 Google Safe Browsing Alerts
The Google Safe Browsing Alerts is a service that examines URLs, software and con-
tent of pages in an attempt to identify unsafe websites. This provides warnings to
users when they attempt to access unsafe websites and allows network administra-
tors to receive information about malicious activity on their network [21].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Fair Good Excellent Good
3.3.5 HoneySpider Network
The HoneySpider Network is a system that aims to identify websites that are ma-
licious to the end user. To achieve this goal it is designed to be modular and able
to combine the outputs of multiple honeypots. After performing periodic scans it
produces a report of threats, as well as the threat’s sources. It can be accessed from
a web browser and supports multiple users [36].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Fair Good Fair Excellent
3.3.6 AusCERT
The AusCERT provides a service called malicious URL feed. It updated regularly
and distributed to anyone that is a member of AusCERT. It is available in two ver-
sions, one containing the feed of the last day and one containing the feed of the last
week. It provides information about several types of malicious activity and can be
utilized to create blacklists and filters to aid protection [5].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
Chapter 3. Proactive techniques and tools 17
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Good Good Good Excellent
3.3.7 Cert.br Distributed Honeypot Project
CERT.br has deployed a distributed network of honeypots across Brazil to collect
network traffic information. It provides daily statistics about activity observed by
its honeypots including the most popular UDP and TCP ports. The aim of sharing
this data is to improve incident detection, correlate events and detect and analyze
trends. Additional information can be provided after contacting the organization
and agreeing to terms of data sharing [7].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Good Fair Good Good
3.3.8 FIRE (FInding Rogue nEtworks)
FIRE (FInding Rogue nEtworks) is a system designed to identify rogue networks
that consistently demonstrate malicious behavior and report the providers that are
responsible for them to the public via the service’s website. It can report the IP
adress, server location and type of the malicious behaviors. It also keeps a record of
previously detected malicious networks. [6].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Good Fair Good Good
3.3.9 Team Cymru – TC Console
The TC Console is a web-based user interface used for the visualization of malicious
activity in a network developed by Team Cymru. Its aim is to improve the user’s
visibility by offering almost real-time information and TSV files that can be used in
automated monitoring of incidents. It can also provide both a summary of previ-
ous activity on the network and quantitative information about traffic. The service
allows data sharing between corporations to potentially provide the possibility of
utilizing more information than what is available directly from the service. Access
to the service is granted after registration and declaration of the interested party’s
autonomous system (AS) numbers [12].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
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timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Good Good Excellent Excellent
3.3.10 EXPOSURE
EXPOSURE is a service that performs passive DNS analysis on a large scale in order
to identify domains involved in malicious activity. It shares a blacklist containing
domains known for past malicious activity. Historical data on previous activity is
also available to allow tracking of changes over time. The contents of the list are
cross referenced with other similar services and can be provided daily [27].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Good Excellent Good Excellent
3.3.11 Zeus/SpyEye Tracker
The Zeus Tracker is a service designed to monitor Zeus C&C servers and fake URLs.
A blocklist is provided in several formats to aid in preventing clients infected by
Zeus from accessing the C&C servers [3]. Lists of active IP addresses, as well as
separate lists for removed addresses are available. The SpyEye tracker was a sim-
ilar service, but is focused on the SpyEye malware instead. However it has been
discontinued after not detecting any activity from SpyEye for over a year [2].
ENISA has rated this service (Zeus Tracker) as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Excellent Excellent Fair Excellent
3.3.12 AMaDa
The abuse.ch Malware Database (AMaDa) is a service that provides a list of C&C
servers. It gathers information by tracing malware samples giving it high quality of
information. The lists are provided in multiple formats such as text, RSS or HTML
[1].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Good Excellent Fair Excellent
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3.3.13 Malware Domain List
The Malware Domain List is a service that provides a list containing URLs that have
been observed participating in malicious activity, such as infections, botnets and
malware hosting. The IP addresses of the associated serves are also provided. The
lists are available in numerous formats, such as CSV, text or RSS. It can be used for
free, as it is a non-commercial community project [28].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Good Excellent Good Excellent
3.3.14 The Spamhaus Project (Spamhaus DNSBL Datafeed)
The Spamhaus Project tracks spam operations across the internet and creates real-
time lists for spam blocking purposes. It provides these lists through a profes-
sional service called the DNSBL Datafeed. It is available as either a query ser-
vice or an Rsync service. The query service allows real time access to Spamhaus
DNSBL’s private network of servers. The Rsync service allows data synchronization
between Spamhaus’s servers and the client’s local servers and is oriented towards
high-volume users. It is available as a yearly subscription service [41].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Good Good Excellent Good
3.3.15 Shadowserver Foundation
The Shadowserver Foundation is a nonprofit security organization that tracks, gath-
ers and analyzes malicious activity. Additionally, it assists in incident response coor-
dination. It provides the ASN & Netblock Alerting & Reporting Service which gen-
erates customized reports about adresses or specific AS numbers that are involved
in malicious activity. The service is free, it updates daily and offers reports in CSV,
HTML, XML, text or URL formats. [19].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Good Excellent Excellent Excellent
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3.3.16 SGNET Honeynet Project
The SGNET Honeynet Project is a distributed network of honeypots. It captures
the traffic from various locations across the world, stores it and enriches it with in-
formation such as location and OS information. This information is updated daily
and is available to the end user in real-time through a graphical interface that can
be accessed through a browser. The project relies on protocol learning and high-
interaction honeypots to ensure a low false-positive rate [37].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Excellent Good Fair Good
3.3.17 ARAKIS
ARAKIS is an early warning system operated by NASK / CERT Polska. Its main aim
is to detect and characterize automated threats. To detect threats it relies on active
scanning through a network of honeypots, firewalls, antivirus systems and adrknets.
It is exclusively focused on networks in Poland. New information is available daily
in CSV format, accompanied with timestamps and a daily summary is generated.
Registration is needed to access the information [35].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Good Excellent Good Excellent
3.3.18 Malc0de database
The Malc0de database contains information regarding URLs that host malware. It
also provides information about the IP address and AS number associated with each
URL. The database is updated several times daily and the contents are available as
an RSS feed, enabling automation capabilities for users. Its data collecting infras-
tructure is undisclosed, thus we have no information on its coverage [30].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Good Excellent N/A Excellent
3.3.19 ParetoLogic URL Clearing House / malwareblacklist.com
The service malwareblacklist.com provides is information on malicious URLs that
are collected by client honeypots. The honeypots try to access sites from a list of
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known malicious addresses, sites identified from spam messages or from malware
details as well as regular sites with lower priority. However its coverage is unclear.
Its information is updated daily or several times a day and can be accessed by a
regular browser or collected with an automated system using an API [10].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Good Good N/A Good
3.3.20 SpamCop
SpamCop is a service designed to report spam by identifying the origin of such
emails and reporting it to the Internet Service Provide responisble for it via email.
Additionally, it provides a Blocking List of IP addresses that have been reported by
SpamCop users as having sent spam emails. There is also support for mirroring the
database for free if access to the mirror is public, or for an annual fee if the mirror is
private. Information about individual IP addresses is also available. The database is
updated almost in real-time and data are available as email messages [39].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Good Good Excellent Good
3.3.21 Arbor ATLAS
The Active Threat Level Analysis System (ATLAS) is a threat analysis network with
a global scope. It provides visibility into the backbone networks that are considered
the Internet’s core, allowing teams to be informed about malicious traffic at a global
scale. It is a publicly available resource, accessible after a free registration. Its data
are updated daily, delivered in CSV, XML or IODEF formats and can be accessed
through a browser or an XML/CSV parser [33].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Good Excellent Excellent Excellent
3.3.22 Composite Blocking List
the Composite Blocking List is a blackhole list of spam email senders based on DNS.
It collects data from spamtraps and mail infrastructures and reports the IP address
of spambots and other entities suspected of spam related activity. Information on in-
dividual addresses is available through the lookup utility it provides. The provider
Chapter 3. Proactive techniques and tools 22
of the service (Spamhaus) encourages accessing CBL through the aforementioned
SpamHaus DNSBL system (section 3.3.14) as it provides more results for potential
queries. Its data is updated in real time and is available through Rsync or through a
Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) which has to be configured [40].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Excellent Fair Excellent Good
3.3.23 Team Cymru’s CSIRT Assistance Program
In addition to the TC Console (section 3.3.9), Team Cymru provides lists concerning
suspicious events related to a CERT’s area of responsibility on a daily basis. The
service is offered for free and any CERT is encouraged to join. Its information is
updated daily with data for the last three days also being available. Data can be
delivered via email and accessed through an HTTP client, aiding in automated col-
lection [11].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Excellent Excellent Excellent Good
3.3.24 CERT.BR Spampots
The Spampots project uses a network of low-interaction honeypots to gather spam-
related data. It has deployed sensors in 11 countries across all continents. The net-
work collects data periodically which is then analyzed by the SpamMining team and
distributed to the members of the project. A web interface with can be exclusively
accessed by members provides additional statistical information about the observed
spam traffic. The data of the service is delivered with little delay, however, accu-
racy of information could not be verified due to the closed membership required to
obtain it [8].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent N/A Good Fair Fair
3.3.25 Project Honeypot
Project Honeypot is designed to identify spammers through a distributed network
of decoy web pages. It achieves that by using custom-tagged email addresses that
are set up to collect messages from spambots that happen to harvest them providing
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information about the time they were contacted and the IP of the sender. The full
extent of the results based on the collected data are available on the service’s website
for registered users. However, non-members can still access the top 25 addresses
identified to be engaged in spam activity. The data feeds are updated every day and
can be obtained through RSS or email [43].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Good Excellent Excellent Good
3.3.26 Malware Threat Center
The Malware Threat Center service provides information on a variety of online
threats by collecting data from firewall filters, antivirus reports and malware bina-
ries to aid network administrators in protection against malware. On a daily basis,
it provides a filter list that is available publicly for free in two formats, a text file and
a web page which contains more detailed information [24].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Fair Excellent Fair Good
3.3.27 Smart Network Data Services
Microsoft’s Smart Network Data Services (SNDS) aim to enable any user that has
control over an IP space to assist in the detection and neutralization of spam malware
and viruses. Any user with a Microsoft Account can request access to the service
regarding the IPs for which they are responsible. Data are aggregated daily and are
available for 90 days after being published. Access is possible either through the
dedicated website, or as a CSV file that can be utilized to aid automation [31].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Good Good Excellent Excellent Good
3.3.28 Malware Patrol
Malware Patrol is a service centered around verification of URLs for malware pres-
ence. The service is developed by community effort, it is free and is provided for
non-commercial use. It provides blacklists of domains that have been identified as
spreading malware. The lists are available to CERTs after an application to request
access. The data is updated daily and is provided in ready-to-use form [34].
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ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent N/A Excellent N/A Excellent
3.3.29 Zone-H
Zone-H is a service that collects defacement reports for websites and maintains a
historical archive of such events. It relies on its open community where anyone can
anonymously submit reports related to defaced websites, which are then checked for
authenticity and added to the database. The lists it provides are updated in real-time
and are available through a website or RSS feed for non-commercial use [22].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Excellent Good Good Fair
3.3.30 Cisco IronPort SenderBase Security Network
Recently merged with Cisco’s new Talos Intelligence Group, SenderBase is a net-
work set up to monitor email and web traffic. It examines parameters such as send-
ing volume, country of origin, complaint levels, appearances as part of an attack
and other parameters. Its database is updated in real time, information is available
in text or CSV formats and its coverage is of global scope [9].
ENISA has rated this service as such:
timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage required resources
Excellent Good Excellent Excellent Good
3.4 Summary
When setting up a system aimed at proactive detection of security incidents, there
are five tools that are considered essential for any CERT as a starting point, to form
a core that can serve as a foundation upon which to expand as time progresses.
• Firewalls as they are present in every network and adapting them to detect
security incidents is relatively easy.
• Antivirus as they are almost as ubiquitous as firewalls and offer a low false-
positive rate.
• IDS/IPS to detect and block attacks against the network. They can also provide
additional attack details for cases not blocked by the firewall.
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• NetFlow for threat detection, post-compromise network forensics and increased
situational awareness.
• Log analysis as valuable information can be gained by properly parsing and
interpreting their contents.
To simplify the process of selecting the appropriate services, depending on different
needs and events, ENISA recommends five specific services from the list of reviewed
services in order to provide CERTs with an adequate level of coverage of security
incidents occurring in their constituency.
• The Shadowserver Foundation as it provides high quality data on botnets,
C&C and DDoS every day. It is free to use and easily available.
• The Zeus/SpyEye Tracker to obtain information about popular spyware. Sam-
ples of malware and IP blacklists are also available to users.
• Google’s Safe Browsing Alerts as a dedicated service for malicious URL discov-
ery backed by Google’s immense processing power, despite some difficulty in
obtaining access to information regarding networks outside the CERT’s con-
stituency.
• The Malware Domain List to obtain information about malicious domains that
propagate malware, as well as classification information for these domains.
• Team Cymru’s CSIRT Assistance Program as having access to high quality
data covering a wide spectrum of incidents types is essential to any CERT.
Additionally, lists of compromised devices associated with the CERT’s ASNs
regarding C&C server, bot infections, malware and phishing are available.
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name timeliness accuracy ease of use coverage
required
resources
DNS-BH Malware Do-
main Blocklist
Fair Good Excellent Excellent Excellent
MalwareURL Good Good Excellent Excellent Excellent
Dshield Excellent Fair Good Excellent Excellent
Google Safe Browsing
Alerts
Good Fair Good Excellent Good
HoneySpider Network Excellent Fair Good Fair Excellent
AusCERT Good Good Good Good Excellent
Cert.br Distributed
Honeypot Project
Good Good Fair Good Good
FIRE (FInding Rogue
nEtworks)
Good Good Fair Good Good
Team Cymru – TC Con-
sole
Excellent Good Good Excellent Excellent
EXPOSURE Good Good Excellent Good Excellent
Zeus/SpyEye Tracker Good Excellent Excellent Fair Excellent
AMaDa Excellent Good Excellent Fair Excellent
Malware Domain List Excellent Good Excellent Good Excellent
The Spamhaus Project
(Spamhaus DNSBL
Datafeed)
Excellent Good Good Excellent Good
Shadowserver Founda-
tion
Good Good Excellent Excellent Excellent
SGNET Honeynet
Project
Good Excellent Good Fair Good
ARAKIS Good Good Excellent Good Excellent
Malc0de database Excellent Good Excellent N/A Excellent
ParetoLogic URL
Clearing House /
malwareblacklist.com
Excellent Good Good N/A Good
SpamCop Excellent Good Good Excellent Good
Arbor ATLAS Good Good Excellent Excellent Excellent
Composite Blocking
List
Excellent Excellent Fair Excellent Good
Team Cymru’s CSIRT
Assistance Program
Good Excellent Excellent Excellent Good
CERT.BR Spampots Excellent N/A Good Fair Fair
Project Honeypot Good Good Excellent Excellent Good
Malware Threat Center Good Fair Excellent Fair Good
Smart Network Data
Services
Good Good Excellent Excellent Good
Malware Patrol Excellent N/A Excellent N/A Excellent
Zone-H Excellent Excellent Good Good Fair
Cisco IronPort Sender-
Base Security Network
Excellent Good Excellent Excellent Good
TABLE 3.1: Services Collective Evaluation Rankings
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name timeliness accuracy
ease of
use
coverage
required
resources
scalability extensibility
Client hon-
eypots
Excellent Fair+ Fair + Fair + Good Excellent Fair
Server hon-
eypots
Excellent Good Good Good Good Good Good
Sandboxes Excellent Fair+ Fair N/A Good Fair+ Fair+
Firewall Excellent Fair Good Fair+ Good Excellent Fair+
IDS/IPS Excellent Good Good Fair+ Fair+ Good Fair+
NetFlow Excellent Good Fair Fair+ Fair Good+ Good
Darknet Excellent Good Fair Fair+ Fair Good Fair
Passive
DNS moni-
toring
Excellent Good+ Good Fair+ Good Good+ Fair
Antivirus
programs
Excellent Good Good Fair+ Good Good N/A
Spamtrap Excellent Fair+ Fair Fair Good Good Good
Web Appli-
cation Fire-
wall
Excellent Good+ Fair Fair Fair Good Good
Application
logs
- - - - - - -
TABLE 3.2: Tools Collective Evaluation Rankings
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Chapter 4
Reactive techniques and tools
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we explored the means that aim to achieve proactive detec-
tion of Cybersecurity incidents. While they provide a strong level of protection, it
is not guaranteed that they will detect and prevent all threats from entering the net-
work and cause damage. In order to be able to combat the incidents that make it past
the primary protection of the proactive defenses, Incident Response mechanisms and
procedures need to be in place, in order to protect the victim’s network against these
threats, or at least mitigate the damage that is caused. The most important element
to make such a secondary line of defense truly effective is high quality information.
The sooner vulnerabilities are identified, the faster they can be patched to deny a
point of weakness. In similar fashion, the sooner an ongoing incident is detected,
the faster the reaction will be and thus the damage caused will be limited.
Even though sharing of security information is widespread, the biggest challenge
faced by CERTs is extracting information in a timely fashion, so that can be immedi-
ately useful from the vast volume of data that are being received. Such information
is referred to as Actionable Information and is at the core of any effort of success-
ful incident response. In this chapter we will explore key properties and general
techniques for an efficient pipeline that produces Actionable Information based on
recommendations by ENISA [16].
4.2 Actionable Information
In general, the term Actionable Information can refer to market data that describe
trends and other information that can be used to improve business decisions by
making them more specific and strategic. To meet the criteria needed to be con-
sidered actionable, information must be timely, accurate, complete in the context of
the business that receives it and ingestible. These criteria also apply to information
concerning IT security, where the goal is to address current threats and reduce the
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impact of future ones. Whether information is considered actionable also varies de-
pending on the recipient.
4.2.1 Relevance
Information can be considered relevant if it is applicable to the recipient’s area of re-
sponsibility, depending on the network, software and hardware infrastructure of its
constituents. When information is referring to compromises happening outside the
area of responsibility of the recipient, it is considered irrelevant. Therefore, precisely
describing one’s constituency using ASNs, CIDRs and domain names is highly pre-
ferred and can be helpful in receiving relevant information through customized data
feeds, or filtered data feeds based on this description.
4.2.2 Timeliness
Information can be considered timely depending on the time it is obtained, but also
depending heavily on the context of the application to which it is relevant to. Due
to the rapidly changing threat characteristics, even information no older than a few
hours may be considered obsolete by the time it arrives. Large volumes of data
being shared make ingestibility difficult, delaying the time it becomes available and
actionable. Additionally, actionable information is usually a result of analysis that
takes time to complete to a satisfying level. Thus timeliness may often be pursued
at the cost of completeness and accuracy. Nevertheless, even information that is
months old can be considered timely in the context of a post compromise damage
mitigation and cleanup operation regarding a recently discovered threat. Finally it
is important for the parties that provide information to correctly assess the required
level of accuracy and not delay making the information available by chasing higher
accuracy that may not be needed.
4.2.3 Accuracy
Information can be considered accurate if the recipient can be sure that it has been
verified and checked for errors before it is received. The accuracy of information is a
product of the confidence that the source asserts, the level of trust between the source
and the receiver and the receiver’s context. An important factor that can define the
trust between the source and the recipient is the transparency on the information
collection process, as it is unlikely that an important action will be made based on
information of dubious origin. Accuracy can also be assessed by the track-record of
the source that is established over time and by previous experience with that source
by looking at indicators such as false positives and false negative rates. Feedback
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to the source and evaluation of received information can be helpful to improve the
data feed in the future.
4.2.4 Completeness
Information can be considered complete if it can provide additional value to infor-
mation that is easily available to the recipient, while being able to stand on its own.
If the information provided by the source can complete gaps in the information that
the recipient already has available through other means it can be considered com-
plete. However, many information providers may decide to reduce the complete-
ness of the information they make available in order to conceal their investigative
methods or due to legal constraints regarding privacy of information. To achieve
a sufficient level of completeness, the provider and the recipient need to come to a
mutual understanding, both about the recipient’s needs, as well as the provider’s
limitations and constraints. Often, standalone pieces of information that may seem
incomplete, can be combined with other sources to become actionable information.
4.2.5 Ingestibility
Information can be considered ingestible if it can be imported to a organization’s in-
formation management systems in a straightforward way and then easily analyzed
to extract indicators. It is mostly defined by the formats and transfer protocols used
for data sharing. In the most usual case, the recipient needs information which can
be used immediately and quickly, in order to combat an ongoing attack, or patch
security vulnerabilities. Typically information is shared between machines and hu-
man reaction can be needed at a later stage. Standardized formats are required in
order to let machines effectively use the provided information.
Finally, actionable information should adopt a format that can represent it in its com-
plete form, while allowing systems to obtain it in an automated and standardized
way and provide the ability to correlate and associate it with other information. The
choice of format is influenced by the number of recipients, the type of information
being stored and the volume and frequency of data.
4.3 Levels of Information
Now that the definition and key characteristics of actionable information has been
established, the activities related to its collection, processing and distribution will be
explored and the information will be categorized. The two most prevalent ways of
categorizing information within the community are:
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• The data model defined by the STIX standard, which provides informal ontol-
ogy that describes a variety of security information, ranging from observables
to high level descriptions of entities like threat actors.
• The Pyramid of Pain[14], which defines a taxonomy organized depending on
the value of indicator types, when defending against complex adversaries.
These are layered according to their value, from simple indicators, such as
hashes of files, to complex ones that describe the attacker’s behavior, such as
TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures).
Since information can exist in many types, for the purpose of protecting a network,
it is convenient to categorize it in four tiers, which are low-level data, detection indi-
cators, advisories, and strategic reports. The most commonly encountered types of
information are distributed in these levels as follows:
• Low-level data include network flow records and full packet captures, applica-
tion logs, including typical IDS alerts, samples of executable files, documents,
and email messages.
• Detection indicators include IP addresses, DNS names, URLs, specific val-
ues of format-specific fields, for example email headers, artifacts, sequences
of low-level events linked to malicious behavior.
• Advisories include ulnerabilities, exploit code, patches, patch status, high-
level patterns of activity on a host, service, network or internet level.
• Strategic reports which are highly summarized threat analyses, written in prose.
As is shown in figure 4.1 as information becomes more complex and abstracted, it of-
fers more condensed information. Typically, large volumes of low-level information
are collected, which are then analyzed to obtain indicators and advisories. These are
in turn assembled intohigh level conclusions and strategic reports.
FIGURE 4.1: Levels of Information
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4.3.1 Low-level Data
In order to implement an information-driven protection system, it is essential to
find good data sources. Usually, CERTs can collect and monitor data related to ac-
tivities that occur within their constituency, which include network traffic, actions
performed by users and behavior of applications. However, without context, this
data is not useful. One way to provide context is to identify potentially affected sys-
tems and, thus use the incident itself as context. Another way, which is mostly used
by automated systems, is to compare the observed behavior to known patterns. Fi-
nally, anomalies in the data can also be combined with detected patterns to provide
additional context. Low level data is usually produced by machines in large vol-
umes, which leads to the need of automated processing, as it needs to be analyzed
in order to become valuable, actionable information.
4.3.2 Detection Indicators
Among the various indicators that exist, that are relevant to security, detection in-
dicators are the only ones that can be considered actionable and, as a result, are
the most commonly used. Detection indicators are patterns that can be compared
with low level data, in order to identify threats. They are based on network char-
acteristics, such as IP addresses, URLs, MD5 hashes of files, as well as strings in
email headers or patterns of invocations of system calls by an application, that can
be observed on the protected network. Additionally, indicators provide informa-
tion about the context, which may allow analysts to understand what the indicator
attempts to detect in an ideal scenario. Indicators of sufficient quality, can be imme-
diately applied for the purpose of detecting malicious behavior without additional
processing other than conversion to a suitable format.
Indicators may be the result of manual analysis, or the result of automated analysis
resulting from observing malware behavior using sandboxes, sinkholes, or honey-
pots. Indicators such as malware signatures can be used to generate alarms con-
taining network addresses of attackers or victims, that are also indicators. The most
frequently shared detection indicators are the following:
• IP addresses of infected machines
• Blocks of IP addresses historically associated with malicious activity
• DNS names for botnet C&C servers
• IP addresses of hosts performing malicious actions
• URLs of websites hosting malicious files and performing drive-by downloads
• Addresses of misconfigured services that can be abused for DoS attacks
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Despite their name implying that threats can be detected after they have taken effect,
detection indicators can be also used for actively blocking threats, as a threat first
needs to be detected in order to be blocked. Indicators of compromise are a subset of
detection indicators that describe behaviors related to intrusion.
4.3.3 Advisories
Advisories include several sorts of information, which, while impossible to translate
directly into threat detection processes, can provide information to analysts that can
lead to defensive actions. Any piece of actionable information that is not an indicator
is considered an advisory. The most prevalent types are the following:
• Vulnerability advisories provide information about vulnerabilities of software
or hardware, as well as context, such as attacks spotted in the wild, sample
exploits and mitigation techniques. Such information is handled in a process
that involves identification of affected assets, risk analysis, development and
deployment of protective measures.
• High-level alerts can be interpreted by analysts in conjunction with low level
data to link observations of monitoring systems, such as information on ab-
normal activities, to specific events.
• TTPs of adversaries characterize behavior on a higher level. By observing
particular sequences of exploit approaches, or specific timing patterns for the
registration, parking, and activation of malicious domains adversaries can be
identified and detected even by automated monitoring systems.
Information of this type is generally unstructured, which does not allow it to easily
translate into actions. It is often in text format, which requires manual analysis to
obtain relevant data. As high-level information requires structured data formats
for exchange, formats such as STIX are developed to meet that demand. To make
advisories actionable, it is important associate them with the correct context of the
organization or environment to which they are relevant.
4.3.4 Strategic reports
Strategic reports are highly summarized reports that aim to provide an overview
of particular situations. Such information can be used by analysts to influence and
inform the decision making and planning process in the future. Due to their high-
level of abstraction, strategic reports cannot be considered immediately actionable.
They can, however, be employed in a complementary fashion, in order to provide
context to other forms of data and provide information to update procedures and
automated control systems. The high level of abstraction that characterizes strategic
reports renders automated systems unable to translate reports into actions.
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4.4 Processing Actionable Information
In the next section we will explore the individual steps of the pipeline that enables
information to be collected, processed, stored, analyzed and distributed. While not
applicable to all situations, this process is focused on recursive tasks that are per-
formed in incident handling, monitoring and intelligence handling. The steps of this
pipeline are relevant to all levels of information with some variations, except strate-
gic reports, due to their abstract nature, which does not allow them to be action-
able without human intervention. In real-world applications within CERTs, these
pipelines do not exist in isolation, as there are many other pipelines operating in
parallel to accommodate the needs of different information. Ideally, data from these
pipelines can be processed in one centralized system, but technical limitations make
such a solution unfeasible. In figure 4.2 below, a generalized information pipeline is
shown.
FIGURE 4.2: General information processing pipeline
4.4.1 Collection
An information processing pipeline needs a way to obtain information in order to
process it and produce results. This logically leads to the observation that the first
step of such a pipeline is a process of obtaining the initial data that will serve as
inputs to the next stages. The collection process needs to be efficient and reliable, as
it influences the quality of the data in the later stages of the pipeline.
Sources of information
One of the basic characteristics of incoming information is the source from which
it was obtained. To clearly define a source we need to identify its vendor, method
of delivery and format, Sources can either be internal, such as network monitoring
systems, or external which can be other companies that provide their own data or
any entity outside the CERT’s constituency. External sources introduce an element
of uncertainty about the accuracy of provided information, which is defined by the
source’s confidence and the level of trust towards the source. Additionally, data are
sometimes processed and changed before being distributed, resulting in important
information, such as the time of collection or the original source, being absent from
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the final product. When it comes to internal sources, such omissions can usually be
avoided, as a result of the greater degree of control the CERT has over them. Internal
sources are also easier to integrate and are available immediately, greatly improving
timeliness. However, they vary in capability, depending on the type of organization,
and are usually limited to gathering information from within the constituency and,
thus, observe attacks in progress and not preemptively. Finally, what may be consid-
ered internal information to one entity, once shared, can become external to another
entity.
The source’s level of automation is an important factor to consider. It can vary be-
tween information produced by an entirely automated system to results of analysis
performed by experts, with the middle ground being automatically generated infor-
mation that has been verified by a specialist. Human analysis results in information
that is more expensive, but lower in volume and more reliable, since false positives
are eliminated. Typically, low-level information is the result of automated processes
and advisories depend more on human actions.
Properties of data collection methods
Depending on the circumstances, the properties of data collection methods can be a
defining factor of the value of the information and the way in which they are used.
The three main characteristics of the collection methods are the following.
• Recurrence is used to describe the periodicity with which data are received.
Information can be received in a singular event, such as a direct report of vul-
nerability, or as a regular feed of information, such as vulnerability advisories
from large vendors. One time reports are considered harder to process and
their handling cannot be easily automated.
• The Consumption Model depends on how the data source provides data. It can
be either a push model, where the source sends data to the receiver, or a pull
model, where the receiver can query for data. While the pull model provides
more control to the receiver, allowing them to request data, it also introduces
additional latency and does not scale adequately to large numbers of users.
As a result, the push model is preferred for high-volume purposes, while its
downside is the lack of control on the time, volume and format of the data that
is sent.
• Granularity depends on the approach that is taken when sending data. In one
hand, the individual contents of the data, such as packets, are sent separately,
On the other hand, data can be sent in batches containing data grouped by
topic based on indicators. The ease of implementation of batch processing is
counteracted by the timeliness penalty it incurs.
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There are multiple ways to collect data of each type, and each one provides some
unique functionality at the cost of other elements. The large number of options of
data collection methods can make it challenging to choose the correct application for
each scenario. Nevertheless, choosing the correct method for the required use can
be beneficial to achieving the expected result.
To alleviate the problem of choosing the correct source for each application, it is im-
portant to have an effective way of evaluating data sources, according to the quality
and actionability of their data. This, in turn, will allow CERTs to effectively compare
available options on a price-to-performance basis and ultimately decide on which
one most effectively covers their needs, within the limitations of the resources they
have. While evaluating a source can be a difficult process, that the CERTs must con-
stantly perform on the sources they use, there are rated inventories of sources to help
when choosing new sources with no previous experience with them.
4.4.2 Preparation
After data collection has been completed, the next step is to modify it, in order to
make it actionable for the recipient, with the main focus being ingestibility.
Parsing
Since data can arrive in a wide variety of formats, which can range from standard-
ized formats, that are compatible with existing tools, to proprietary or vendor spe-
cific formats, there is a need to isolate the significant contents form each one to per-
form analysis. To achieve that, specialized parsers are developed for each of these
formats of raw input, aiming to extract the relevant information and normalize the
output for further processing in the pipeline. Depending on the parser, data can
either be fully normalized to represent specific types if information internally, or
be preserved, allowing further parsing at a later time. Preserving the original data
allows greater flexibility but it is a more difficult approach to implement. An in-
termediate solution is to perform normalization of the data, while also retaining the
original input as a point of reference. This comes with additional computational and
storage overheads, especially for high-volume data. Preserving the original format
of data provides advantages even if they cannot be processed in real-time. These
include the following.
• It allows a user to verify if the parsing was performed correctly, if any problems
arise at a later point in time.
• When sharing data with external entities, providing the original form can in-
crease the confidence into the received report
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• If the normalized form changes then existing data can be parsed again, which
should guarantee that no information is lost during conversion
Normalization
When trying to map various input formats to an internal data structure the two
most prevalent problems are heterogeneity of data and a lack of common ontology.
Heterogeneity stems from the large variety of different types of information that a
CERT receives. Since there are multiple pipelines for different types of information,
this problem is somewhat mitigated, however, designers need to balance the design
of the unified internal representation between generality and specificity. Generality
allows more information to be normalized and makes it more complex, resulting in
higher costs when attempting further processing. Specificity makes further process-
ing easier and cheaper at the cost of limiting the types of information that can be
represented.
The lack of common ontology to form the foundation of a normalized form of in-
formation security is a problem the STIX attempts to address. A typical example
where normalization of a data element is especially difficult is the case of identifiers
of malicious software, since there is no common point of reference and vendors of-
ten use different names to describe the same threat. Since normalization is applied
to groups of similar data, CERTs can consider a few normalized forms as standard if
it fits the context of their organization. However, if an organization cannot invest in
developing in-house data models, they usually have to rely on the models found in
existing solutions.
Normalization difficulties leading to misinterpretation are more common in the case
of one-time data exchanges, but established sources are not immune to this problem
as well. Data formats may be completely overhauled, which requires the parsers to
adapt in order to stay relevant. In cases of changes being applied to specific fea-
tures, while the rest of the format stays backwards compatible, information can be
interpreted incorrectly if the new features affect the content or the context.
Aggregation
Often, information may contain more details than what an organization needs, or
contain repeated occurrences of the same event that provide no additional value.
After parsing and normalizing it, this information can be aggregated in a single entry
that is representative of its original form. Aggregation can be part of the information
processing pipeline, or be implemented by sources, that provide already aggregated
data, which is especially beneficial, if they provide high-volume, low-level data.
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Enrichment
The previous steps mainly attempt to improve the ingestibility of information. En-
richment focuses on providing already existing information with additional context,
in order to improve its completeness. This is achieved by correlating identifiers of
the information with databases, which can be either internal or external. Addition-
ally, if a CERT has access to otherwise inaccessible assets, it can use the additional
information to make incoming data more enriched. Enrichment can also positively
affect the accuracy of information by cleaning up the data and performing quality
assurance. This can be achieved by verifying that data elements are well formed
and the syntax is valid, eliminating artifacts that occur due to the collection method
and provide no value, avoid easily identifiable false positives by using whitelists
and ensure that reported values are within the expected parameters for the given
institution.
Automation
The process of preparing the data is mostly automated, even for data that was col-
lected by manual means. Even in the event of data that are provided only once, it
is more efficient to utilize modified existing automated tools, rather than manually
preparing it. Choosing the correct system for managing information can signifi-
cantly impact the speed at which new information is integrated. New sources may
be incompatible with the existing tools, which leads to infrastructure reworks or new
infrastructure altogether. To avoid that, it is usually possible to modify incompatible
sources to existing infrastructure, at the cost of partially losing information.
4.4.3 Storage
Storage of data is an important part of the information processing pipeline and plays
an important role in how the next two steps of the pipeline will be designed. CERTs
must make a choice between utilizing existing storage solutions or creating their
own. It is not a clear choice to make, because existing solutions might need heavy
modification to suit the needs of an institution and building a custom storage infras-
tructure requires significant effort and resources.
Retention time
Determining how long data should be retained in storage is an important design
decision and can vary between only storing data for the time needed to analyze and
distribute them and keeping them long-term for statistical analysis. Historical data
can be useful in the context of operations and analysis and can become more relevant
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as time passes. However, the retention duration is limited by two significant factors.
Legal regulations concerning personal data define a period after which the data are
required to be deleted. Technical limitations limit the amount of data that can be
stored and sometimes high data volume can adversely affect query performance.
Scale
Storage solutions should be designed to be able to scale according to the require-
ments of the user. The key areas in which a storage system must be scalable are the
following.
• keep up with writing the incoming data without introducing additional de-
lays, thus preserving timeliness
• store data for the chosen retention period
• provide read access to archived data with adequate performance
Depending on the requirements of storage volume the performance of the storage
system can limit the performance of the processing pipeline. In the use case of
CERTs, which tend to acquire more data over time, it is logical to choose a scal-
able solution to accommodate that growth in data volume. The volume of data in-
creases for lower levels of information and is significantly smaller for higher ones as
is shown in figure 4.1.
• Low-level data is usually received in large volumes and is usually not worth
keeping once actionable information has been extracted from it, so it can be
deleted. In case the original input is stored alongside the normalized format,
the storage requirements increase substantially.
• Indicators can be a source of information that is large in volume, however, once
aggregated, they become significantly more compact and can be stored more
easily.
• Advisories and reports are impose insignificant storage loads compared to
other types of information and can be easily stored.
Dataset Management
Due to working with multiple sets of data, efficient management of stored informa-
tion is a priority for CERTs. Each source has its own requirements for management
and without an appropriate solution to accommodate these needs, the complexity
of such a system may become overwhelming, especially when storing information
coming from one-time sources. To keep the contents of a repository under control,
metadata are required, which provide additional information about the stored data
and depends on the needs and infrastructure. The value of metadata increases when
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there are multiple sources at play, as it can provide information about the datasets
that can result in a more streamlined management system.
Technologies
The storage backend technology that is chosen can significantly affect the perfor-
mance and scalability of a storage system, as well as define its ability to integrate
custom built software. The most commonly used technology for database manage-
ment are Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMS), which rely on SQL to
provide a standard way of communication across vendors and provide the ability
to submit complex queries on structured data. The RDBMS is a mature and well
studied technology, however in certain circumstances it cannot scale to a degree suf-
ficient to meet the needs of certain applications that rely on semi-structured data.
An alternative solution is a collection of technologies known as NoSQL, which do
not rely on structured data models. The main advantage of NoSQL solutions is their
ability to effectively scale to large volumes of data in the order of petabytes.
4.4.4 Analysis
After passing through the stages of collection, preparation and storage, further anal-
ysis can be performed on data before they get to the stage of distribution. Analysis
is not an indispensable part of the pipeline, as information can be passed on to con-
stituents directly. However, combining data from multiple sources can lead to addi-
tional information being discovered and provide better context and more relevance
for the constituents.
The input of the analysis step is the collected and prepared information that was
obtained by the previous steps of the pipeline, but is not yet considered actionable.
In this step the aim is to provide additional context details that are not immediately
apparent from the original data. Analysis has the potential to lead from a multitude
of low-level indicators to actionable strategic reports. Additionally, by combining
data from multiple sources and different levels, relationships that would otherwise
go unnoticed can be observed.
Investigation
One of the typical activities of CERTs is investigative work, whether it is an inves-
tigation on an intrusion, a phishing campaign, or other threat relevant to the con-
stituency. The main focus is analysis, but all the steps of the information processing
pipeline can be included in an investigation. The result of an investigation usually
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is new, actionable information that can only be obtained in this manner, which justi-
fies the effort and resources that are invested in investigations. In an investigation,
typical activities include the following.
• Analysts select data with high degrees of completeness and accuracy, that is
also suspected of containing relevant information
• Additional data are gathered when needed, either manually, or by the use of
automated systems
• Data from multiple sources is collected and correlated
• Data is gathered from internal and external repositories to collect all the needed
information, which requires infrastructure with adequate query capabilities
Investigative work revolves around correlation, which gives analysts a better un-
derstanding of the context, which leads to new observations on the already avail-
able information. Additionally, visualization techniques can improve the ability to
correlate data from different sources, since visually representing the relationships
between entities makes important patterns in the data easier to spot.
In the case a CERT receives a report of intrusion, either through its Intrusion De-
tection System, or a report by a user, an investigation is launched as a reaction. In
this situation, the aim of the investigation is to minimize the damage caused by
the current threat and outline the measures that need to be implemented to prevent
such incidents in the future. The first step in that process is to assess the severity
of the incident based on the affected machines or subnetwork. The potential threat
must be verified by cross referencing the observed data with other, existing sources.
After confirming a threat analysts need to assess the impact of the threat to the con-
stituency, whether the events are isolated or part of a campaign, what information
is missing and how to neutralize the threat, if possible. When a threat is active,
time is critical and actionable information should be generated and put to use as
soon as possible, which requires tools to enable analysts to reach that goal by min-
imizing the manual effort required to perform analysis. CERTs can also perform
exploratory analysis to acquire a better insight of their environment, constituency
and potential threats. This is an iterative process, which extracts information about
potential threats in each iteration that need to be investigated, which provides the
opportunity to prepare for future threats. Additionally, even if a detected anomaly
in activity does not apply to the CERT’s constituency, it may be relevant to the wider
community.
Situational Awareness
Situational awareness, in the context of security, can be described as a CERT’s under-
standing of the security state of its constituency and knowledge of potential threats
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to the constituency and their key attributes. A good level of situational awareness
allows a CERT to be better prepared to react to incoming attacks or handle malware
outbreaks both by preventative measures and a robust mitigation procedure. Early
warning systems further increase the level of situational awareness, that is typically
achieved through a continuous systematic process. Automated systems that aid in
analysis are an essential part of this process, however they are not enough to pro-
vide situational awareness on their own, as human interpretation of the data they
provide is required. Therefore, analysts still play an essential role in the process of
situational awareness by providing an expert opinion on the actionable information
provided by the automated system, in order to reach a conclusion. This information
can then be used to mitigate future attacks and shared with other organizations. All
types of information can be useful to improve situational awareness by performing
the correct analysis on them.
Situational awareness can be divided into two categories, internal and external.
• Internal situational awareness describes the extent to which a CERT has a good
understanding of the constituency it is tasked to defend. It is based on knowl-
edge of assets and infrastructure within the organization, which adds context
to any information received about a threat. Information about network infras-
tructure and an accurate way of profiling the activity that occurs within the
network can significantly boost internal awareness, by allowing the detection
of anomalies in comparison to typical behavior.
• External situational awareness concentrates on gaining knowledge about rel-
evant threats and is usually more difficult to achieve than internal situational
awareness. An effective way to achieve it is to observe the general tactics of
malicious actors and the activity of malware to pinpoint the most widespread
types of malware. Additionally, the infrastructure used to facilitate malicious
campaigns can be identified. Despite the high value of this information, there
are no automated tools that can perform the analysis required to obtain it.
Finally, visualization can be a useful tool in achieving situational awareness, as the
ability of humans to identify patterns in visual data can speed up the process of
spotting anomalies and new tools are being developed in order to make access to it
easier.
Metrics
Quantitative information is central to data driven approaches that are used for per-
formance evaluation and future planning. Metrics can be used to describe different
areas of interest within the CERT and then compared with other CERTs to evaluate
relative performance. These include:
• Number of machines infected by malware
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• Number of attacks originating from the constituency
• Remediation rate –the proportion of IP addresses that are repeatedly reported
in incident reports to the total number of attack sources
The results of such metrics can be used to determine the capability of a CERT against
different types of attacks and detect trends in attack patterns, allowing a more tar-
geted allocation of the CERT’s resources, to counter these trends. This evaluation
also aids in improving the CERT’s situational awareness.
Meta-analysis and source evaluation
Since data is being collected from numerous sources, it is important to be able to de-
termine the quality of information provided by each one, in order to reliably choose
sources that can provide information that will be usable and actionable in the future.
To achieve that, meta-analysis can be performed on received information to provide
reports on accuracy. Finally, it is important that source evaluation is treated as an
ongoing process, which can allow CERTs to identify unreliable sources and confirm
the quality of trusted sources by using more objective criteria.
4.4.5 Distribution
The last step of the information processing pipeline is distribution. This is where
the information that was obtained from the previous stages is applied and sent to
external entities. In order to ensure that appropriate actions have been taken for the
mitigation of incidents, the constituents need to be notified and act based on the pro-
vided instructions and information. Defining the method of delivering accurate and
timely information requires significant effort and depends on the needs of the con-
stituency. In cases that the CERT handles an incident itself, it still needs to distribute
indicators to security systems. The last part of the distribution process is sharing
information between trusted partners, to collectively analyze it. Depending on who
receives the information, the characteristics that make information actionable may
differ.
Internal Entities
The most usual scenario that a CERT faces is distributing information to the con-
stituency it is responsible for, for internal consumption. In this case it is able to
directly participate in incident mitigation, or closely cooperate with security related
groups in the organization. In this situation, data can be easily distributed to the
organization’s network, with minor adjustments to the infrastructure, or the format
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of the data, to accommodate automated systems. The effectiveness of this relation-
ship can be held back by the quality of information, as information of insufficient
quality will not be utilized. Provided an adequate level of quality, CERTs can use
information to detect threats and once a CERT is confident in the information it has
at its disposal, it can deploy an automated system to improve response time.
External Entities
In cases where a CERT has no direct control over the constituency it is responsible
for, it has to adopt a role of providing coordination to the efforts of threat mitigation.
It is often the case, that CERTs have access to relevant information that is not directly
related to the organization it is responsible for. This information should be shared
with other organizations, to potentially act as an early warning, provided there are
no legal restriction to doing so. This improves the effectiveness of efforts to mitigate
threats, as cooperation provides better results that working in isolation. Another
form of sending information to external entities, is the case of feedback sent to data
providers in order to improve the quality of their data feeds.
An important consideration when sharing information is the ability of the recipient
to receive and process the information in order to act upon it. There are three main
categories, based on this ability.
• Low capability recipients are usually small organizations with no dedicated
CERT and few automated systems in place. These may lack the capability to
process advanced forms of information, such as real time feeds.
• Medium capability recipients are usually enterprises that have a basic security
infrastructure and can handle security data with automated systems.
• High capability recipients have dedicated CERTs, cooperate with security ven-
dors to provide infrastructure to store and process data and can handle real
time feeds from various sources easily.
Based in the recipient’s capability to receive data, CERTs can decide what data is
worth being shared and what is the appropriate format to facilitate communication.
4.5 Summary
When setting up a system to respond to threats, actionable information is the most
valuable resource a CERT can utilize. To obtain such information, a procedure must
be established, that can enable the CERT to collect, prepare, store, analyze and fi-
nally distribute information. This process must be carefully designed to meet the
demands of the CERT’s constituency, given the technical capabilities it has at its
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disposal. If executed properly, it can yield information that is relevant to the con-
stituency, timely, accurate, complete and easily ingestible by the organization’s man-
agement systems. This information can, in turn, be used to mitigate the damage of
attacks, or even prevent threats from entering the constituency altogether.
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